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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Daniel Walter Bergerud and Kathleen Gay Bergerud appeal from their judgments 
of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing, manufacturing a 
controlled substance where a child is present, possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana, and, in the case of 
Mrs. Bergerud, possession of psilocybin mushrooms. On appeal, they assert that the 
district court abused its discretion when it did not permit them to ask whether a state's 
witness had ever lied to the police. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Mr. and Mrs. Bergerud, each, with (1) trafficking in 
methamphetamine by manufacturing, (2) manufacturing a controlled substance where a 
child is present, (3) possession of a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine, (4) conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, (5) possession of 
drug paraphernalia, (6) possession of marijuana, and (7) possession of psilocybin 
mushrooms. (R., pp.113-36.) Both Mr. and Mrs. Bergerud pleaded not guilty and 
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.137-43.) Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the district court 
joined the two cases for trial and all future proceedings. (R., p.163-66.) 
At trial, in rebuttal, the state called Rob Jones, who had lived for a time in the 
Bergeruds' basement. (Tr., p.687, L.23 - p.688, L.15.) The state, noting that Mr. Jones 
lacked any felony convictions, moved the district court to exclude any questions 
regarding whether Mr. Jones had ever been convicted of any sort of crime. (Tr., p.677, 
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L.22 - p.678, L.6.) Defense counsel1 responded that he intended to ask whether Mr. 
had ever lied to the police in order to impeach Mr. Jones with evidence of a 2003 
misdemeanor conviction for providing false information to the police. (Tr., p.678, L.10 -
p.679, L.4.) The district court granted the state's motion. (Tr., p.680, L.19 - p.682, 
L.14.) The state, "just to be safe," also moved to exclude defense counsel's question, 
"Have you ever lied to the police before?" (Tr., p.682, Ls.20-22.) The district court, 
finding that such a question did not appear to be relevant to Mr. Jones' credibility while 
giving testimony under oath, or to be a proper area of inquiry, indicated that it was also 
excluded. (Tr., p.683, L.5 - p.684, L.6.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Bergerud guilty on Counts I 
through VI, but found him not guilty of Count VII, possession of psilocybin mushrooms. 
(R., pp.225-26.) The jury found Mrs. Bergerud guilty on all counts. (R., pp.227-28.) 
The district court entered judgments of conviction against each of the Bergeruds and 
imposed on them unified sentences of seven years with five years fixed. 2 (R., pp.345-
50.) The Bergeruds filed timely notices of appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order consolidating the Bergeruds' appeals. (Notice of Appeal, filed on or about 
September 30, 2011; R., p.355.) 
1 Defense counsel, Brian D. Long, represented both Mr. and Mrs. Bergerud. (See R., 
pp.107-08.) 
2 On Count I, the district court sentenced each of the Bergeruds to the mandatory 
minimum of five years fixed, concurrent with their sentences on Counts Ill (two years 
indeterminate) and IV (five years fixed). On Count II, the court sentenced each of the 
Bergeruds to two years indeterminate to be served consecutive to their sentences on 
Counts I, Ill, and IV. (R., pp.345-50.) The district judge ordered that the sentences on 
the remaining counts, all misdemeanors, run concurrent. (R., pp.340-44.) 
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ISSUE 
The Bergeruds state the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the 
Bergeruds from inquiring into Mr. Jones's character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness? 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Have the Bergeruds failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
not permitting a marginally relevant and inappropriate line of cross-examination at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Bergeruds Have Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion 
A Introduction 
During trial, the state, in rebuttal, chose to present testimony from Rob Jones. 
(Tr., p.677, Ls.19-24.) Because a records check indicated that Mr. Jones did not have 
any felony convictions, the state moved to exclude any questions regarding whether he 
had been convicted of any crimes. (Tr., p.677, L.25 - p.678, L.6.) Defense counsel 
responded that he had done his own records check and, while Mr. Jones did not have 
any felonies, some seven or eight years prior, in 2003, he had pied guilty to providing 
false information to a police officer. (Tr., p.678, Ls.10-23.) Defense counsel explained 
that he intended to ask Mr. Jones if he had ever lied to the police and, if he said no, 
bring in the misdemeanor conviction under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608. (Tr., p.678, 
L.15 - p.679, L.4.) The state responded that Rule 608 was not intended as a run-
around of Rule 609, and that Rule 609 was clear: only evidence of felony convictions 
was admissible. (Tr., p.679, L.6 - p.680, L.3.) Defense counsel argued that he should 
be allowed to use the conviction to impeach Mr. Jones "if I ask him, 'Have you ever lied 
to law enforcement before,' and he says, 'No."' (Tr., p.680, Ls.5-18.) 
The district court granted the state's motion to exclude any question regarding 
whether Mr. Jones had any prior convictions, including any question about whether he 
had ever lied to the police. (Tr., p.680, L.19 - p.682, L.18.) Ultimately, the district court 
determined that the area of inquiry was neither relevant nor proper. (Tr., p.684, Ls.4-6.) 
On appeal, the Bergeruds argue that the district court abused its discretion by not 
allowing cross-examination into whether Mr. Jones had ever lied to the police. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.) Application of the correct legal standards, however, shows 
no abuse of discretion by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"This Court freely reviews the question of relevancy as an issue of law." State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010). A district court's decision to 
admit or exclude evidence proffered during cross-examination under Rule 608(b) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90-91, 856 P.2d 
872, 880-81 (1993). 
C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion By Excluding Evidence 
Regarding Whether Mr. Jones Had Ever Lied To The Police 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) controls the admissibility of evidence of specific 
instances of a witness's conduct for the purpose of impeaching a witness and provides: 
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness 
concerning (1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined 
has testified. 
l.R.E. 608(b). Whether to admit impeachment evidence under Rule 608(b) lies within 
the discretion of the district court. Araiza, 124 Idaho at 90-91, 856 P.2d at 880-81. In 
this case, the district court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, did not permit the 
Bergeruds to inquire whether Mr. Jones had ever lied to the police. 
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During cross-examination, a trial court can prevent interrogation that is only 
marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). "As evidence 
goes back further in time-that is, becomes more remote-it is entitled to decreasing 
weight." Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 559, 746 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Arguing for admissibility, defense counsel acknowledged that Mr. Jones' conviction for 
providing false information to a police officer occurred in 2003 (Tr., p.678, Ls.21-23), 
and that he would ask "about a specific instance of conduct in 2003" (Tr., p.680, Ls.15-
18). The Bergeruds' trial occurred in 2011, seven or eight years after that specific 
instance of conduct. (R., pp.172-224.) Because the specific instance of providing false 
information to the police was so remote, occurring some seven or eight years prior to 
the trial, it was marginally relevant at best and the district court properly exercised its 
discretion by excluding it. 
The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 
149, 911 P.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1996). In that sexual abuse case, Downing argued that he 
should have been able to cross-examine his victim regarding prior allegedly false 
accusations which she made against Downing when she was six or seven years old. !st 
at 151, 911 P.2d at 147. The district court determined that allegations of childhood 
fabrications, which occurred eight or nine years prior to trial, were too remote to support 
Downing's contention that his victim was untruthful. !st at 152, 911 P.2d at 148. The 
Court of Appeals held, both because of the victim's natural maturation from child to 
adolescent and the allegations' remoteness, that "the trial court could properly conclude 
that the alleged false accusations ... would have added nothing of probative value to the 
case." kl Similarly, because Mr. Jones' conduct in providing false information to a 
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police officer in 2003-some seven or eight years prior to trial-was so remote, the trial 
could properly conclude that it would have added little probative value to the case. 
Furthermore, as found by the district court, defense counsel's proposed line of 
inquiry into whether Mr. Jones had ever provided false information to the police was 
inappropriate in this case. Defense counsel openly admitted that his intention in asking 
whether Mr. Jones had ever lied to police was to lay foundation to impeach Mr. Jones 
with extrinsic evidence of his misdemeanor conviction. (Tr., p.678, L.10 - p.679, L.4; 
p.680, Ls.5-18.) This is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 608(b) is directly on point and provides: "Specific instances of the conduct 
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence." I.RE. 608(b) (emphasis added). Rule 609, under certain criteria, permits 
the admission of "evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony 
and the nature of the felony" to attack the credibility of the witness. I.RE. 609(a). 
However, by its terms, Rule 609 only applies to felony convictions. Id. 
Rule 608 was not intended as a mechanism to avoid the limitations of Rule 609. 
Rather, "Rule 608(b) permits impeachment only by specific acts that have not resulted 
in a criminal conviction." United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 
2009) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 327 
(5th Cir. 1998) ("Prior bad acts that have not resulted in a conviction are admissible 
under [Rule] 608(b) if relevant to the witness's character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.") (emphasis added); Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th 
Cir. 1991) ("Under [Rule] 608(b), a defendant may impeach a Government witness by 
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cross-examining him about specific instances of conduct not resulting in conviction if 
conduct is probative of the witness'[s] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.") 
(emphasis added)). As acknowledged by defense counsel, his question regarding 
whether Mr. Jones had ever lied to police was intended to illicit information "about a 
specific instance of conduct in 2003." (Tr., p.680, Ls.15-18 (emphasis added).) 
Because that specific instance of conduct resulted in Mr. Jones' conviction for providing 
false information to police, its admissibility was controlled by Rule 609 and cross-
examination was not permitted under Rule 608(b). The district court therefore properly 
exercised its discretion by not permitting the line of inquiry. 
On appeal, the Bergeruds assert that the district court abused its discretion by 
not permitting them to ask Mr. Jones if he had ever lied to the police. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.13-16.) Citing a statement by the district court, the Bergeruds argue that the court 
failed to recognize its discretion to permit the line of inquiry and that it "concluded that 
specific instances of conduct could only be inquired into by reputation evidence." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) The district court, however, never expressly prohibited the 
Bergeruds from using specific instances of conduct, generally, to impeach Mr. Jones 
under Rule 608. The district court expressly prohibited the Bergeruds from using a 
particular specific instance of conduct to impeach Mr. Jones: his lying to the police in 
2003, which was marginally relevant and intended to be part of an inappropriate line of 
cross-examination. (Tr., p.680, L.19 - p.682, L.13; p.684, Ls.4-6.) 
The statement quoted by the Bergeruds on appeal was made in response to 
defense counsel's argument that the line of cross-examination should be allowed 
because "if he has lied to law enforcement and now today he's coming in being called 
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as a witness by law enforcement, how do we know he's not lying to them today?" (Tr., 
L.23 - p.683, L.3.) The district court disagreed with defense counsel's analysis 
noting, "he's not addressing law enforcement today; he's addressing a court of law. 
He's testifying in court." (Tr., p.683, Ls.5-7.) Then the district court, referring to an 
earlier discussion, expressed its opinion that, when a party seeks to establish a 
witness's character for untruthfulness, it is more effective to present reputation evidence 
than to interrogate the witness about every instance when they may have lied to another 
individual. (Tr., p.683, Ls.7-18; see also p.680, L 19 - p.681, L.3.) That exchange, 
which occurred after the district court initially granted the state's motion, does not show 
a failure to recognize the district court's discretion, especially where it had just exercised 
that discretion in determining to not allow the particular line of inquiry. (See Tr., p.680, 
L.19-p.682, L.13.) 
The Bergeruds alternatively argue that the district court abused its discretion by 
not exercising reason, because he "equated Mr. Jones's alleged conduct to lying to 
one's family." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) Contrary to the Bergeruds' argument, 
however, the district court's analogizing lying to the police to lying to one's boss or 
children, and the district court's differentiating that type of conduct from giving testimony 
under oath (Tr., p.680, L.19 - p.681, L.3), clearly demonstrates that the district court 
was exercising reason. While the Bergeruds may disagree with the district court's 
analysis, "where reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court 
will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with its 
own." State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation 
omitted). 
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Even if the district court's reasoning is wrong, its ultimate ruling should still be 
affirmed. This Court will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal 
analysis by applying the correct legal analysis. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 
P.3d 895, 901 (2001). As explained above, because Mr. Jones' conduct was remote, it 
was marginally relevant and therefore could properly be excluded. Furthermore, 
because defense counsel, by his own admission, sought to ask if Mr. Jones had ever 
lied to the police in order to present evidence prohibited by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
the district court could properly exclude that inappropriate line of cross-examination. 
Therefore, even if the district court's analysis was wrong, its ultimate conclusion, that 
the line of inquiry was neither sufficiently relevant nor proper, is correct, and the district 
court should be affirmed. 
D. Even If The District Court Erred By Not Permitting Defense Counsel To Inquire If 
Mr. Jones Had Ever Lied To The Police, Such Error Was Harmless 
Even if the district court erred by not permitting the Bergeruds to ask Mr. Jones if 
he had ever lied to the police, considering the overwhelming evidence establishing the 
Bergeruds' guilt, such error was harmless. "[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal 
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. Furthermore, 
"[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.RE. 103(a); see also l.C.R. 52 ("Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury 
would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923 (citing Chapman v. California, 
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386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The state bears 
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 
(2010). 
On appeal, citing statements made by the district court during sentencing, the 
Bergeruds argue that Mr. Jones' credibility was critical to the state's case. (Appellant's 
brief, p.16.) At sentencing, the district court noted that the Bergeruds had "certainly 
inferred that . . . Mr. Jones, who had lived in the basement, may very well have had 
access and responsibility toward what was located in the house as opposed to whether 
it was the Bergeruds' responsibility." (Tr., p.798, Ls.16-24.) The court expressed its 
concern that Mr. Jones may have also been involved in the criminal enterprise, making 
his credibility suspect. (Tr., p.799, L.4 - p.800, L.12.) However, even if Mr. Jones was 
primarily responsible for the meth lab located at the Bergeruds' residence, that would 
not ultimately aid the Bergeruds' defense. The Bergeruds were charged in the 
alternative as aiders and abettors in the manufacture of methamphetamine (R., pp.114, 
126), and the district court explained to the jury in its instructions that it could find the 
Bergeruds guilty as aiders and abettors (Tr., p.700, L.8 - p.701, L.19; p.707, L.18 -
p.709, L.4; p.715, L.17-p.716, L.18; see also R., pp.273-74, 283-84, 294-95). 
Even assuming that Mr. Jones was primarily responsible for the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, the evidence of the Bergeruds' participation in the enterprise was 
overwhelming. At trial, Detective Paul Berger, who had extensive training and 
experience detecting and processing meth labs (see Tr., p.125, L.21 - p.130, L.8), 
testified that he detected the strong odor of a meth lab in the Bergeruds' residence (Tr., 
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p.142, L.6 - p.143, L.8). Police found iodine, a chemical used in the process of making 
methamphetamine, throughout the house. (Tr., p.130, Ls.9-20; p.158, Ls.5-11; p.163, 
L.21 - p.164, L.4; p.177, Ls.4-7.) They found matchbooks with their striker plates 
removed, evidence of another precursor, in the basement fireplace and in the garbage 
outside the Bergeruds' residence. (Tr., p.54, Ls.4-19; p.118, Ls.5-17; p.177, Ls.14-25; 
p.180, L 17 - p.181, L.1.) Receipts and calendars, which were entered into evidence 
during the trial, showed that the Bergeruds purchased approximately 2,500 pills of 
pseudoephedrine, the primary precursor, over the course of 18 months. (Tr., p.82, L.15 
- p.83, L.1; p.195, L.1 - p.198, L.4; see also State's Ex. 1, 2, and 13-A.) Additionally, 
police found a bottle of muriatic acid behind a lattice outside the residence containing 
the white sludge commonly seen in a gas generator for methamphetamine (Tr., p.179, 
Ls.2-25; p.182, Ls.1-15), and a glass bottle and a heating plate, both stained with 
iodine, which had been used for cooking methamphetamine. (Tr., p.187, L.2 - p.188, 
L.1 ). Police also located a container of processed methamphetamine in the Bergeruds' 
basement. (Tr., p.176, L.20 - p.177, L. 7; p.269, L.5 - p.270, L.11.) 
Idaho law does not distinguish between principals and aiders and abettors. l.C. § 
19-1430. Because the evidence of the Bergeruds' participation in trafficking in 
methamphetamine by manufacturing and manufacturing methamphetamine in the 
presence of a child was overwhelming, even if the district court erred by not permitting 
defense counsel's proposed line of inquiry, such error was harmless because it did not 
affect the ultimate outcome of the trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Bergeruds' convictions 
and sentences. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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